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Pricing Strategies in Dual-channel for Small and Medium-Sized
Manufacturers
Fangfang Jia1, Li Li1
1
School of Economics & Management, Nanjing University of Science & Technology, China
Abstract: For the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers who are in the weak position in dual-channel marketing, they are
often faced with channel price conflict. Therefore, it is necessary for the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers to
formulate effective pricing strategies. This paper modeled pricing strategies for two scenarios, which involved the
manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually and a retailer Stackelberg game. Then we investigated the impacts of
digital attribute of product and power structure on the optimal pricing strategies. Besides, we considered the change both of
manufacturer and retailer’s profits when the digital attribute of product is heterogeneous and the power structure is difference
using computational studies. Our analyses show that, the non-dominant manufacturer decides online direct price according to
the dominant retailer’s pricing strategy is a win-win strategy, both manufacturer and retailer are better off, and the
dual-channel’s total profits also improve.

Keywords: dual-channel, pricing strategies, Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers, digital attribute of product

1.

INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of E-commerce technology, more and more Small and Medium-Sized

Manufacturers are increasingly adopting dual-channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel
and the online direct channel. But the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers are restricted by the scale of
operation, the dual-channel brings more profit and more challenges simultaneously. With the expansion of
online direct marketing, the manufacturers and traditional retailers will compete for the common customers,
such as Levis is forced to give up the online direct channel for the resistance of the retailer partners. In addition,
some traditional retailers’ business scale is larger than the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers and they can
contact with consumers directly, the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers’ power is relatively weaker than
traditional retailers, for example, ELADE must paid 40% of retail sales to B&Q as a "slotting allowance" when
it sells its products in the large building materials retail supermarket B&Q. But for ELADE, in order to improve
sales and profits, the price of online direct channel is much lower than traditional retailer B&Q. In view of these
price conflicts, what pricing strategies should the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers take to alleviate
channel conflict and maintain the dual-channel?
In the study on dual-channel, Kurata [1] pointed out that when the channel competition and brand competition
coexistence, price subsidy policy can coordinate the supply chain. Gangshu (George)Cai

[2]

assessed the impact

of price discount contract on dual-channel supply chain and indicated that the price discount contract can
appease channel conflict. Hou.J,Zhao.L.d

[3]

showed that the change of price strategy in direct channel can

achieve the coordination of the supply network. The above documents show that, price is a key factor in
coordinate of dual-channel. On the study of pricing strategy in dual-channel, Chiang [4] examined a price-setting
game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer based on the consumer choice model. Yao and Liu

[5]

looked at price competition between the two channels using Bertrand and Stackelberg game models. Gila E.
Fruchter

[6]

assumed that the consumers’ acceptance to online shopping was heterogeneity, and he examined the

dynamic pricing strategy of dual-channel, where manufacturer as leader in the Stackelberg game. Dumrongsiri [7]
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studied the dominant manufacturer’s pricing strategy in the condition that market demand was affected by the
price and consumer perceived service. Huang and Swaminathan

[8]

assumed that the demand was only affected

by price, the degrees of substitution of two channels and the potential market demand, and they studied the
optimal pricing strategy when manufacturer had the same power to control the two channels. Guowei Hua

[9]

studied the pricing strategy from two perspective, concentrated pricing and distributed pricing. Yajun Guo

[10]

considered the internal reason that caused the channel conflict when the manufacturer is a leader, while they
designed a dual-channel coordination strategy in a manufacturer Stackelberg game. Hong Wang [11] discussed the
influence of retailer's degree of risk aversion on pricing strategy in a manufacturer Stackelberg game. In
summary, the previous research mainly considered that manufacturer is a leader or manufacturer has equality
with retailer. However, how to develop a reasonable pricing strategy when the manufacturer falls in a weak
position in dual-channel, this issue has been rarely concerned, and it seems to be worthy of study.
In addition, compares with large retailers, the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturer's bargaining power is
very limited. In order to sell its products in the large retail store and promote its brand image, the Small and
Medium-Sized Manufacturer has to accept the retailer’s price discount. That is, the retailer sets a price discount
for each product, and extracts some share of the retail sales as its own income, and the remaining profit is for the
manufacturer. This pricing pattern is widely used in the practice of the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers,
so the previous literature ([5],[7],[8],[9],[10],[11]) discussed the dual-channel pricing strategy by wholesale
price is not suitable for the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers.
Different from previous studies, we consider the form of transaction between manufacturer and retailer by
price discount, and we also examine the impact of digital attribute of product on the demand of distribution
channels. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and formulates the decision
models for manufacturer and retailer, respectively. In section 3 and 4, we examine the pricing strategies in
different scenarios and analyze the impacts of parameters on pricing strategies. In section 5, we report the results
of computational experiments carried out to examine the relationships between power structure and pricing
strategies and investigate the influence of digital attribute of product on these relationships. We conclude the
results and suggest topics for future research in Section 6.
2.

THE BASIC MODEL
We assume that all retailers are homogeneous, the dual-channel system includes one manufacturer, one

retailer and consumers. The manufacturer produces only one product, the consumers are risk-neutral, and they
choose the purchase channel according to their perceived utility. The manufacturer decides the price of online
direct channel, the retailer decides the price of traditional channel and the commission percentage of retail sales,
and retailer pays the rest of retail sales to manufacturer as the wholesale price. The variable symbols involved in
this system are as follows:
R ：the reservation price of the product.

t ：the unit psychological cost caused by the consumers’ psychological preferences.

s ：the consumers’ psychological preferences, s  0,1 .
pd ：the price of online direct channel.
pr ：the price of traditional channel.
r ：the share of the retail sales that the retailer extract from the traditional distribution channel.

d d ：the demand of online direct channel.
d r ：the demand of traditional channel.
c ：the manufacturer’s unit cost of product.

 m ：the manufacturer’s total profit.
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 r ：the retailer’s total profit.
 ：the dual-channel’s total profit.

Our model builds on the familiar linear Hotelling model. Suppose there is a linear city of length 1, the
traditional retailer’s store is at 0, and the online direct store is at 1.Assuming that consumers uniformly
distributed in  0,1 , for all of the consumers in s  0,1 , their psychological cost for purchase the product from
retailer’s store is ts .Suppose that each consumer has a unit demand, and they choose the channel which they can
get more utility. To ensure that consumers will choose any one of the two channels to purchase product, we
let R is sufficiently large, both the utility that consumers can obtain from the two channels are positive.
In reality, there are a variety of factors (for example: price, brand, outward appearance, etc) will affect
consumers’ perceived utility. In particular, the most significant factor is the digital attribute of product in
dual-channel marketing [12]. The digital attribute of product is some product attribute information which can be
described by text, graphics, images, etc and can be transferred through the web. For different types of products,
the digital attribute of product shows obvious difference, for instance, the digital attribute of clothing and
footwear is significantly lower than books and audio/video products. In traditional channel, consumers can
obtain a clear perceived utility by experience the goods personally, so they generally prefer to buy the lower
digital attribute goods from traditional channel. In contrary, online direct channel can provide more convenient
search tools and review information about products, it also helps consumers reduce search time and
transportation costs, so consumers prefer to buy the higher digital attribute goods from online direct channel.
Liang and Huang’s empirical study also showed that the higher the digital attribute of product, the more
consumers prefer online direct channel, the lower the digital attribute of product, the more consumers prefer
traditional channel

[13]

. Therefore, we consider the influence of digital attribute of product on consumers’

perceived utility, the consumer’s utility function is as follows:
ud ( R)   R  t (1  s)  pd , purchase from online direct channel


ur ( R)  (1   ) R  ts  pr , purchase from traditional channel
where  denote the digital attribute of product, 0    1 .The bigger  , the bigger perceived utility of online
direct channel  R , otherwise, the smaller the perceived utility of online direct channel.

ur ( R)  (1   ) R  ts  pr
0

ud ( R)   R  t (1  s)  pd
1

s

Figure 1. the market share of traditional channel and online direct channel respectively

For risk-neutral consumers, they usually choose the purchase channel according to the principle of utility
maximization. Fig.1 describes the market share of traditional channel and online direct channel respectively,
where s is the point of no difference, that is, (1   ) R  ts  pr   R  t (1  s)  pd , then

s  [1  2  R  pd  pr  t ]/ 2t established. When s  [1  2  R  pd  pr  t ]/ 2t , ur ( R)  ud ( R) , consumers
will choose the traditional channel. When, ud ( R)  ur ( R) , consumers will choose the online direct channel. To
ensure s in [0,1] , we focus on the digital attribute of product that satisfy

1 pr  pd  t
1 p  pd  t

   r
,
2
2R
2
2R

and this interval is contained in [0,1] (proved in Appendix1).
Form Fig.1, the demand of traditional channel and the demand of online direct channel are as follows:
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(1  2 ) R  pd  pr  t
2t

dd  1  s 
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(1  2 ) R  pd  pr  t
2t



As a result, the retailer’s profit and the manufacturer’s profit are determined respectively by

 m ( pd )  ( pd  c)  d d  (1  r ) pr  c   d r


(1  r ) pr (1  2 ) R  pd (1  2 ) R  (1  r ) pr2  (1  r ) pr t  (2  r ) pr pd  pd2  pd t  2ct
2t

 r ( pr )  r  pr  d r  r  pr 

1  2  R  pd  pr  t
2t

=



rpr (1  2 ) R  rpr pd  rpr2  rtpr
 
2t

where r denotes the share of retail sales that the retailer extract from the traditional distribution channel, and the
rest 1  r is manufacture’s retail profit from the traditional channel.

3.

DUAL-CHANNEL PRICING STRATEGY OF DIFFERENT POWER STRUCTURE
In our dual-channel system, the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers will be in the relatively

disadvantaged position when they are often faced with large retailers. We will examine the pricing strategy of
the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually (scenario 1) and the retailer Stackelberg
game(scenario 2)in the next section.
3.1 Manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually.
In this section we consider an uncooperative dual-channel, in which both the manufacturer and the retailer
make their own decisions to maximize their individual profits simultaneously. Manufacturer and retailer will
reach the Nash equilibrium under the condition

 m ( pd )
 r ( pr )
 0 and
 0 respectively. In this case, the
pd
pr

manufacturer and the retailer maximize their own profit with the optimal channel price

pd*1 

r (1  2 ) R  rt  4t
2r



pr*1 

(1  2 ) R  3t
2r



Substituting (6)and(7)into (2),(3),(4),(5) and simplifying, we obtain (8),(9),(10),(11)and(12). Therefore, in
this scenario, the demand of online direct channel, the demand of traditional channel, the manufacturer’s
optimal profits , the retailer’s optimal profits and the dual-channel’s total profit are given, respectively, by
d d1 

(1  2 ) R  2rt  t
2t (2  r )



d r1 

(1  2 ) R  3t
2t (2  r )



 m1 ( pd ) 

[(1  2 ) R]2  2t (r 2  3r  1)(1  2 ) R  2r 2t 2  2rt 2  13t 2
c
2t (2  r )2



 r1 ( pr ) 

r[(1  2 ) R]2  6rt (1  2 ) R  9rt 2
2t (2  r )2



1 

(1  r )[(1  2 ) R]2  2t (r 2  1)(1  2 ) R  2r 2t 2  7rt 2  13t 2
c
2t (2  r )2



Since the digital attribute of product significantly affects customers’ perceived utility, in the dual-channel
system, when manufacturer and retailer make their own decisions to maximize their individual profits,
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pd*1 , pr*1 ,  m*1 ( pd ) and  r*1 ( pr ) are affected by R , t , r and  , in addition,  m*1 ( pd ) also affected by c .
3.2 The retailer Stackelberg game.
In this section we consider the retailer Stackelberg game, i.e., the retailer, as the Stackelberg leader,
determines pr and r first, then the manufacturer as the follower sets its optimal online direct price pd based on
the retailer’s decisions.
Stage 1. First, we assume that the retailer’s price is known, when

 m ( pd )
 0 , the manufacturer maximize its
pd

individual profit, the price of online direct channel is determined by

pd 


（1  2）R  (2  r ) pr  t
2



Stage 2. The retailer, maximize its individual profit, substituting (13) into (5), we obtain the price of traditional
channel in the retailer Stackelberg game
pr2 

(1  2 ) R  3t
2r



Then we obtain the price of online direct channel in the retailer Stackelberg game

pd2 

(2  3r )(1  2 ) R  rt  6t
4r



Substituting (14),(15)into(2),(3),(4),(5), and simplifying, we obtain(16),(17),(18),(19)and(20). Therefore, in
the retailer Stackelberg game, the demand of online direct channel, the demand of traditional channel, the
manufacturer’s optimal profits , the retailer’s optimal profits and the dual-channel’s total profit are given,
respectively, by
d d2 

(1  2 ) R  5t
8t



d r2 

(1  2 ) R  3t
8t



 m2 ( pd ) 

r[(1  2 ) R]2  (16t  26rt )(1  2 ) R  23rt 2  48t 2
c
32rt



 r2 ( pr ) 

[(1  2 ) R]2  6t (1  2 ) R  9t 2
16t



2 

3r[(1  2 ) R]2  (16t  14rt )[(1  2 ) R]  5rt 2  48t 2
c
32rt



From the above analysis, in the retailer Stackelberg game, pd*2 , pr*2 ,  m*2 ( pd ) and  r*2 ( pr ) are affected by

R , t , r and  , in addition,  m*2 ( pd ) also affected by c .
Since the solution of our model is complex, the difference of the manufacturer and the retailer’s pricing
strategies and profits in the two scenarios cannot be directly observed, we will analyze the impacts of digital
attribute of product and power structure on pricing strategies and investigate the impacts of these two factors on
the manufacturer, the retailer and the channel total profits in section 4 and 5.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DUAL-CHANNEL MODEL

4.1 Analysis of digital attribute of product.
Proposition 1. In the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually, the price of online
direct channel pd*1 increases with increasing the digital attribute of product  , the price of traditional channel

pr*1 decreases with increasing  .
The proof of Proposition 1, as well as the proofs of the other propositions, is given in Appendix. Proposition 1
indicates that in the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually, the price of online
direct channel and the digital attribute of product are positively correlated, the price of traditional channel and
the digital attribute of product are negatively correlated.
Proposition 2. In the retailer Stackelberg game, if 2 / 3  r  1 , then the price of online direct
channel pd*2 increases with increasing  . If 0  r  2 / 3 , then the price of online direct channel pd*2 decreases with
increasing  . The price of traditional channel pr*2 always decreases with increasing  .
Proposition 2 indicates that in the retailer Stackelberg game, if 2 / 3  r  1 , then pd*2 /   0 , the price of
online direct channel and the digital attribute of product are positively correlated. If 0  r  2 / 3 ,
then pd*2 /   0 , the price of online direct channel and the digital attribute of product are negatively correlated.
However, no matter how much the share of retail sales that the retailer extract from traditional distribution
channel r changes, the price of traditional channel and the digital attribute of product are always negatively
correlated. This conclusion also partially reveals price dispersion in dual-channel

[14]

. In reality, the parameter r is

exogenous, for different industries, the value of r is different, but , r will not be over 0.5 generally, so in our
model, the value of r will be in 0, 2 / 3 .
4.2 Analysis of power structure.
Proposition 3. Both the price of online direct channel and the price of traditional channel in the retailer
Stackelberg game are always higher than the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually.
Proposition 3 shows that, although the manufacturer is in a weak position, the price of online direct increases
instead. As the Stackelberg leader, the retailer has the priority to decide the price, so the price of the traditional
channel will obviously increase. Accordingly, both the manufacturer and the retailer will price higher if they
choose to negotiate price rather than price respectively.
Proposition 4. The market share of online direct channel in the retailer Stackelberg game is always higher than
the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually, and the market share of traditional
channel in the retailer Stackelberg game is always lower than the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make
decisions individually.
Proposition 4 indicates that, although the manufacturer is in a weak position, the market share of online direct
increases instead. Thus, for the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers, the opening of dual-channel marketing
can help they increase the online direct sales. As the market share of traditional channel reduced, the retailer will
raise the price of traditional channel inevitably to maintain its own interest. This property also proved
proposition 3.
5.

COMPUTATIONAL STUDIES
Our objective in this section is to draw managerial insights based on a numerical analysis of our model. We

consider two situations related to different parties in our model. First, we consider the impacts of the digital
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attribute of product on manufacturer and retailer’s profits. Second, we focus on the difference of manufacturer
and retailer’s profits and dual-channel’s total profit in two scenarios. In the rest of this section, we illustrate our
results with a numerical example. The parameters for this example are R  100, t  10, c  10 and r  0.4 .
When manufacturer and retailer make their own pricing strategies individually,   [0.41,0.65] , in the retailer
Stackelberg game,   [0.25,0.65] . From Figs.2-5, the horizontal axis denotes digital attribute of product  ,
the vertical axis denotes profit.
5.1 Analysis of digital attribute of product.
From Fig.2, if manufacturer and retailer make
their own decisions to maximize their individual
profits, as  increases, the manufacturer’s profit
decreases firstly, then goes up later, but the
retailer’s profit decreases with increasing  .
Another interesting observation from Fig.2 is that,
the manufacturer’s profit is far less than the
retailer’s

profit

if  is

relatively

smaller,

as  increases, the manufacturer’s profit at
equilibrium increases at a faster rate than the
retailer’s profit and far greater than retailer finally.
Thus, it is indeed possible for the manufacturer to
focus on the digital attribute of product in order to
be more profitable than the retailer in this scenario.

Figure 2.

the manufacturer and the retailer's profit when
they make decisions individually

In a retailer Stackelberg game, from Fig.3 we can
find that, as  increases, both manufacturer and
retailer’s

equilibrium

profit

goes

down,

when  reaches its maximum, the retailer’s profit
closes to 0. The above results indeed show that the
higher  , the lower the base level of demand in
traditional channel, therefore, the retailer will be
forced out of the traditional retail channel. Take the
audio/video market for example, since the digital
attribute of audio/video product is very high, it is
obviously easy to transmit the product information
through the network, thence, many audio/video
stores in traditional channel are replaced by online

Figure 3. the manufacturer and the retailer's profit in a
retailer Stackelberg game

stores. This result poses a grave threat to traditional audio/video stores, and the traditional audio/video stores
become less and less.
5.2 Analysis of profit in two scenarios.
Fig.4 shows that, no matter how  changes, in a retailer Stackelberg game, both manufacturer and retailer’s
profit always more than the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually. This conclusion
also validates the double marginalization effect. Accordingly, as long as the channel members adopt a
cooperative manner when they negotiate, both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off.
Fig.5 shows that, no matter how  changes, the dual-channel’s total profit in the retailer Stackelberg game is
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always higher than the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions individually. Therefore, in the
retailer Stackelberg game, not only the channel members’ profits would be enhanced, but also the dual-channel’s
total profit increased.

6.

CONCLUSIONS
For the Small and Medium-Sized Manufacturers who are in the weak position and suffer the price conflict

when they carry out dual-channel marketing, in this paper, we examined the impact of digital attribute of
product on the demand of dual-channel, which includes an online direct channel owned by the manufacturer and
a traditional retail channel. In order to coordinate the dual-channel relationships, we modeled the pricing
strategies for two scenarios, which involves the scenario that manufacturer and retailer make decisions
individually and the retailer Stackelberg game, and described the optimal coordination pricing strategies. Then
Figure 4. the difference in manufacturer's profit

Figure 5 .the dual-channel’s total profit in two

 ( pd )   ( pd ) and the difference in retailer's profit

scenarios

2
m

1
m

 ( pr )   ( pr ) in two scenarios.
2
r

1
r

we investigated the impacts of digital attribute of product and power structure on optimal pricing strategies.
Besides, we considered the change both of manufacturer and retailer’s profits when the power structure is
difference and the digital attribute of product is heterogeneous using computational studies. The analyses show
that, when the manufacturer and the retailer make decisions individually, with the digital attribute of product
increasing, the price of online direct channel increases and the price of traditional channel decreases. In the
retailer Stackelberg game, the relationship between the price of online direct channel and the digital attribute of
product is affected by r , but the price of traditional channel always decreases with the increasing digital
attribute of product. Our studies also show that manufacturer decides price according to retailer’s pricing
strategy is a win-win strategy, both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off, and the dual-channel’s total
profits also improve.
Note that the decision-making situation is more complicated in practice, there may be more than one
manufacturer and more than one retailer in supply chain, in the future, we can consider the model with more
complicated supply chain structures and a number of potential parameters.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 70971065.
REFERENCES
[1] Hisashi Kurata, Dong-Qing Yao, John J.Liu. (2007). Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and
national vs. store brand competition . European Journal of Operational Research, ,180:262-281
[2] Gang shu(George)Cai, Zhe George Zhang, Michael Zhang.(2008).Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel
supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes. International Journal of Production Economics,8,53
[3] Jing Hou, Lindu Zhao. (2007). Coordination of dual-channel supply chain under demand disruption.JOURNAL OF
SOUTHEAST UNIVERSITY (Natural Science Edition),37 (2):272-277(in Chinese)
[4] Wei-yu Kevin Chiang, Dilip Chhajed, James D. Hess. (2003). Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of
Dual-Channel Supply-Chain Design. Management Science,49(1):1-20
[5] Yao, D.Q.,Liu, J.J.(2005). Competitive pricing of mixed retail and e-tail distribution channels. Omega,33 (3):235-247

56

The Eleventh Wuhan International Conference on E-Business——E-Business and Developments Track

[6] Gila E. Fruchter, Charles S. Tapiero.(2005). Dynamic Online and Offline Channel Pricing for Heterogeneous Customers
in Virtual Acceptance. International Game Theory Review,2(7):137-150
[7] Aussadavut Dumrongsiri, Ming Fan, Apurva Jain, Kamran Moinzadeh.(2008). A supply chain model with direct and
retail channels. European Journal of Operational Research, ,187:691-718
[8] Huang, W., Swaminathan, J.M.(2009). Introduction of a second channel: Implications for pricing and profits.European
Journal of Operational Research,,194:258-279
[9] Guowei Hua, Shouyang Wang, T.C.E.Cheng.(2010). Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains.
Europe Journal of Operational Research,,205:113-126
[10] Ya jun Guo, Liqiang Zhao.(2008). The conflict and coordination in dual channel based on e-market.Systems
Engineering Theory and Practice,9(28):59-66(in Chinese)
[11] Hong Wang, Weitao Ni, Jing Zhou.(2010). Pricing Decision in Dual Channel Supply Chain under Asymmetric
Information. Chinese Journal o f Management,2(7):238-242(in Chinese)
[12] Carl Shapiro, Hal Varian.(2000). Information Rules: A Strategy Guide to the Network Economy. China People’s
University Press,68-90
[13] Liang, T.P., Huang, J.S.(1998). An empirical study on consumer acceptance of products in electronic markets: A
transaction cost model. Decision Support Systems,,24:29-43
[14] Mustafa Caglayan, Alpay Filiztekin, Michael T. Rauh.(2008). Inflation, price dispersion, and market structure.European
Economic Review,,55:1187-1208

